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The Second Time as Tragedy: The Assisted
Suicide Cases and the Heritage of Roe v. Wade
By SETH F. KRBIMR7
I. Introduction: The Abortion Controversy and the Fate of
Substantive Due Process
For the last quarter century, Roe v. Wade' has provided a landmark for
constitutional analysis. Those who envisioned judicial review primarily as
a backstop to majoritarian politics began with the proposition that Roe, like
Lochner v. New YorJ before it, was insupportable as constitutional doc-
trine, and rejected a role for the Court in enforcing unenumerated constitu-
tional rights. Those who viewed the Court as an appropriate standard
bearer for extra-textual normative aspirations often admitted the weakness
of Roe's stated rationales, but nonetheless began with Roe as a touchstone
and reasoned toward other rights.
A decade ago, the opponents of Roe seemed poised to triumph in the
Supreme Court, but Planned Parenthood v. Casey3 appeared to turn the
tide.4 Amidst a harshly divided series of opinions, a decisive plurality of
the Court reaffirmed the vitality of Roe, if only as a matter of stare decisis,
and endorsed, on its merits, the role of judicial review in the protection of
unenumerated rights The plurality opinion buttressed the somewhat in-
choate claims of "privacy" that underlay Roe with a constellation of ration-
ales that built on rights to bodily autonomy, spiritual integrity, and gender
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Copyright October 1997.
This essay has benefitted from the comments of my colleague, Matt Adler, as well as the informa-
tion and insights I have obtained as a participant in the Greenwall Seminar on Social Sciences in
Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania. Any mistakes, misapprehensions or missteps are, of
course, my own responsibility.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4. A similar and parallel watershed arguably occurred in the political arena two years ear-
lier with the rejection of Judge Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bruce
A. Ackerman, Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process: Transformative Appoint-
ments, 101 HARV. L. 1EV. 1164 (1988).
5. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-53.
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equality.6 At the same time, the Casey dissenters attacked the plurality's
project as an avatar of ajudicial role rejected with the fall of Lochner in the
constitutional reconstruction that attended the New Deal.7
In the intervening five years, the Court has been willing, if not eager,
to take constitutional issue with the outcome of the democratic process in a
series of cases, 8 but it has not invoked substantive due process in those con-
frontations? Consequently, until last Term's assisted suicide cases, the
Court has had no occasion to elaborate on the rationales for protecting re-
productive autonomy, or how those rationales fit with the broader enter-
prise of protecting unenumerated rights. On both sides of the aisle, the ac-
cusation of reviving the substantive due process of Lochner has remained
an epithet of choice; indeed the Casey dissenters tended to deny the legiti-
macy of the entire enterprise of substantive due process analysis.10
This Term's assisted suicide cases bade fair to reopen the debate. The
Court faced two separate circuits whose various opinions adopted at least
four separate doctrinal approaches on a contested issue of public morality,
6. See id. at 856.
7. Id. at 998.
8. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
2264 (1996); Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct 2157
(1997); Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Adarand Constructors Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
9. The Court has rejected substantive due process challenges this Term outside the assisted
suicide arena in Mazurekv. Armstrong, 117 S. CL 1865, 1867 (1997); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117
S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997); and Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. CL 1169, 1172 (1997). Earlier post-
Casey claims have been no more successful. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994);
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); Concrete Pipe of Cal. v. Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602 (1993); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
The Court sustained a challenge to a punitive damages verdict in BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. CL 1589, 1604 (1996)--though it is not at all settled that a challenge to ajury
verdict is quite the same as a challenge to the decisions of political branches.
10. For liberals accusing conservatives of reviving Lochner, see Seminole, 116 S. CL at 1176
n.60 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (Souter, ., dissenting); Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard, 512 U.S. 374, 406 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw, 116 S. CL at 1907 (Stevens, 3.,
dissenting) (accusing majority of relying on a "speculative substantive due process righe').
For conservatives accusing liberals of misusing substantive due process, and questioning the
legitimacy of the doctrine, see, for example, TXO v. Alliance Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Carlton, 512 U.S. at 39. (Scalia, J., concurring) ("If I thought that 'sub-
stantive due process' were a constitutional right rather than an oxymoron... ."); Albright, 510
U.S. at 275 (Scalia, 3., concurring); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 125 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("so-called 'substantive due process.'); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)
(Rehnquist, J.) ("more generalized notion of 'substantive due process"'); BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1611
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Substantive due process right" is an "unjustified incursion into the prov-
ince of state governments."). But cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 58 (1988) (Scalia, I., concur-
ring) (acknowledging "due process" right against prison physician's deliberate indifference).
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as well as an orchestrated array of amicus briefs the like of which it had not
encountered since Casey." One might have expected that the specter of
two circuits simultaneously wielding Casey to invalidate long-standing
prohibitions of the criminal law would provoke the Casey dissenters again
to attack the legitimacy of extra-textual judicial review. On the other hand,
the rationales of bodily autonomy and spiritual integrity which had been
sketched in Casey tended to support the decisions of the Second and Ninth
Circuits that terminally ill patients should have a right to assistance in
ending their lives. In determining whether or not, as I put it in an earlier
commentary, one could be pro-choice but anti-Kevorkian, 12 the heirs of the
Casey plurality could have been expected to solidify and clarify the basis of
their decision.
In fact, neither outcome came to pass. The Court was unanimous in
accepting Roe and Casey-and with them substantive due process analy-
sis-as part of the contemporary constitutional canon.13 Moreover, every
opinion accepted a substantive extra-textual right to "bodily integrity" that,
until now, had seemed only tenuously grounded. At the same time, the
Court was unanimous in voting to reject the Second and Ninth Circuit's
opinions and remitting the basic issue of assisted suicide to the state and
federal political processes.1
4
The Court's unanimity on these issues, however, was voiced in no less
than six separate opinions.' 5 What remains unclear, therefore, is exactly
how the Court accomplished these potentially contradictory results, or what
the combination means for either the future of assisted suicide or of con-
stitutional law. This article explores these questions.
Washington v. Glucksberg16 marks the end of a generation of discord
over the legitimacy of substantive due process. Nonetheless, I suggest that
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion cannot sustain its claim that an "es-
tablished method" of substantive due process analysis, rooted in history and
tradition, explains both the abortion cases and Glucksberg.17 I argue that
although Justice Souter's call for "arbitrariness review" based in the corn-
11. The LEXIS online computer service lists 62 briefs lodged with the Court in Washington
v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), and 61 in Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). By way
of comparison, it lists 37 briefs in Casey.
12. See Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorklan? An Essay on Roe, Casey
and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803 (1995).
13. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-53.
14. See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2230-32; Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct at 2274.
15. I leave to one side the majority opinion in Quill which depends on the basic proposition
in Glucksberg that the prohibition of assisted suicide is not to be regarded with any heightened
judicial skepticism. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2264-65.
16. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
17. Id. at2260.
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mon law can account for the outcome in Glucksberg,18 it lacks constitu-
tional mooring. By contrast, I maintain that the focus on physical suffering,
informing the concurrences of Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg, is
both constitutionally supportable and morally informative. Finally, I ad-
vance the proposition that whatever their individual failings, the opinions
in Glucksberg, taken as a whole, do a signal service to the nation. In my
view, the Court has redeemed the promise of Roe by respectfully consider-
ing a tragic conflict and providing frameworks for further moral argument
by the rest of society.
11. Substantive Due Process, the Body, and the Constitutional
Canon
The unanimity of the Justices in Glucksberg powerfully illustrates the
current status of substantive due process. For Justices O'Connor and
Souter, who joined the prevailing plurality opinion in Casey, and Justice
Stevens, who concurred separately, there is nothing new in the proposition
that "substantive due process" review is a legitimate judicial enterprise, and
that it encompasses the abortion right. In their separate opinions in the as-
sisted suicide cases, each of these Justices assumes that in implementing
the commands of the Due Process Clause, the Court has authority to invali-
date legislation that is sufficiently at odds with our society's moral aspira-
tions. 9
Justice Breyer, who joined the court after the Casey decision, wrote an
opinion accepting the legitimacy of the enterprise of identifying "arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints" as well as "interests" that "require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgement." 20 Justice Ginsburg, who is likewise new to the official de-
bate, filed a cryptic concurrence in the judgment. aligning herself with the
views of Justice O'Connor?' Neither of these positions is much of a sur-
prise.
18. Id. at 2258.
19. See id. at 2277 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 2306-07 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor's position is a bit more opaque. In light of her prior concurrence in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (arguing that there is a fundamental
right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment), it is clear that she sees a role for substantive due
process in defense of bodily autonomy, but her concurrence in Glucksberg goes no further than
"assuming" the recognition in an interest in avoiding terminal suffering, on the way to refusing to
address it, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
21. See id. at 2310. It is unclear exactly what methodology Justice Ginsburg believes is ap-
propriate. Justice Ginsburg has tartly criticized the use of a "vague concept of substantive due
[Vol. 24:863
It is Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Glucksberg that provides
the novelty. Although Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist each dis-
sented in Casey, they join the proposition that "[i]n a long line of cases, we
have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause in-
cludes the rights... to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abor-
tion."22 Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion that contained this
language; Justices Thomas and Scalia joined the majority opinion without
reservation? 3 Unlike the Casey dissents, which contested the legitimacy of
judicial involvement in the entire enterprise of enforcing unenumerated
rights, the majority opinion in Glucksberg makes it unanimous among sit-
ting Justices that the courts may intervene on behalf of unenumerated rights
in general and reproductive autonomy in particular.24 At least for the near
future, the Supreme Court has reached an equilibrium in which the right to
choose an abortion is accepted as a constitutionally protected interest on a
par with the constellation of family, marriage, and contraception.
The majority opinions in the assisted suicide cases reaffmn, as well,
the right to bodily integrity as a maxim of constitutional analysis. In
Glucksberg the majority includes "bodily integrity" in its litany of consti-
process, a 'raised eyebrow test' as its ultimate guide.' BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct.
1589, 1617 (1996) (citation omitted). She has suggested elsewhere that Roe would have been
better resolved on equal protection grounds. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in A Judicial
Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199-1200 (1992).
22. 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (citations omitted). See id. at 2262 ("We begin, as we do in all due-
process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices.") (citing Casey,
505 U.S. at 849-50). Justice Rehnquist's opinion was even able to muster an approving citation to
Roe itself as supporting the proposition that the Court has protected "personal activi-
ties.., identified as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our con-
cept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
At at 2271. Moreover, the Glucksberg majority cited the joint plurality opinion in Casey as "the
Court's opinion" which concluded "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and
once again reaffirmed." Id. at 2270 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846).
Justice Rehnquist's opinion inAlbrightv. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994), had earlier cited
Casey as according substantive due process protection in "matters relating to marriage, family,
procreation, and the right to bodily integrity," but it did not mention abortion. Justice Scalia's
special concurrence in Albright reiterated his opposition to substantive due process analysis out-
side ofincorporation. Id at 275-76 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Another indication of the state of affairs is the per curiam opinion in Mazurek v. Armstrong,
117 S. Ct. 1865, 1868 (1997), which rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the merits, but nonetheless
cited Roe as setting the basic standard in the area ofabortion.
23. See l17S. Ctat2260.
24. Likewise, the per curiam decisions this Term, rejecting particular challenges to state
statutes which interfere with the opportunities to obtain abortions, still accepted the legitimate role
of the courts in judging whether interferences rose to a magnitude that imperilled conceded con-
stitutional rights. See Mazurek, 117 S. Ct. 1865 (rejecting challenge to statute requiring abortions
to be performed only by licensed physicians); Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169 (1997) (re-
jecting challenge to parental notification requirement for abortions sought by minors).
Summer 19971 THE SECOND TRME AS TRAGEDY 867
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY
tutionally protected interests 5 This recognition provides a clear and wel-
come announcement of the constitutional stature of the physical rights of
the citizens' persons against government intrusion-an affirmation that was
not part of the rationale in Roe v. Wade. It was, after all, less than a quarter
century ago that the Court intimated a strong general constitutional protec-
tion against bodily abuse by governmental officials, 26 and several members
of the Court have in the interim suggested a limitation of substantive due
process rights to those rights which have textual analogues in the Bill of
Rights. As late as last year, a circuit panel en banc held that a right to
avoid sexual assault by governmental officials was not sufficiently well-
grounded to form the predicate for criminal prosecution. 28 Glucksberg and
Quill, combined with the comments this Term in United States v. Lanier,2 9
put an end to any doubts that the federal courts can legitimately invoke the
norms of substantive due process to protect citizens against physical abuse
by the government in all venues.
The assisted suicide opinions reaffirmed, as well, the proposition that
patients have a constitutionally protected right to refuse life sustaining
25. 117 S. Ct. at 2267. In Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), the Court reads Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), as based in a "well established,
traditional right to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching." 117 S. Ct. at 2301,
(citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79).
26. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-74 (1977). Ingraham rejected a claim that
brutal paddling of students constituted cruel and unusual punishment, but classified the right to
avoid physical assault as a "liberty interest." In the same term, the Supreme Court for the first
time accepted a prisoner's claim that the imposition of physical suffering by prison guards was
constitutionally barred. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
27. See, e.g., Allbright, 510 U.S. at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring); id at 273. (plurality opinion
of Rehnquist, J.) ("Where a particular Amendment provides explicit textual source of constitu-
tional protection... that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due proc-
ess' must be the guide," (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395)); cf. Graham, 490 U.S. 395 ("[A]ll
claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force... should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment... rather than under a substantive due process standard").
Justice Scalia, despite his scorn for "substantive due process" in most areas, has at least once
accepted the proposition that a prison physician who causes physical harm by deliberate indiffer-
ence violates "the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against the deprivation of liberty without
due process." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 58 (1988) (Scalia, 3., concurring).
28. See United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), revd, 117 S.
Ct. 1219 (1997).
29. Lanier, 117 S.Ct. at 1228 n.7 ("Graham v. Connor does not hold that all constitutional
claims relating to physically abusive government conduct must arise under either the Fourth or
Eighth Amendments... [rather than] the rubric of substantive due process." (citation omitted)).
As I have suggested elsewhere, the efforts to constrain physical abuse by government offi-
cials constitutes both one of the most prominent and one of the most eminently justifiable roles
that judicial review plays in our current constitutional equilibrium. See Seth F. Kreimer Explor-
ing the Dark Matter ofJudicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY
BiLL OFRTS. J. 427 (1997).
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treatment.3 ° In Cruzan, the Supreme Court had assumed arguendo that a
right to bodily integrity protected competent patients against being treated
against their will?' This proposition could have been regarded as dictum.
In Glucksberg, the right to refuse life sustaining treatment has advanced to
the status of a maxim of constitutional law. This is no revolution, since the
right to refuse such treatment is recognized in most states as a matter of lo-
cal positive law,32 but, again, it demonstrates how far the courts have come
in two decades.
This unanimity of approval for protecting abortion as an unenumer-
ated right and the reaffirmation of a more general right of bodily autonomy,
however, mask a decided lack of consensus on other issues. The Justices
disagreed on the analytical basis for the right to bodily autonomy and were
far from clear as to how their reasoning meshes with the unanimous rejec-
tion of the plaintiffs' claims.
I. The Majority's "Established Method": Constitutional Law
as Tradition
In writing the Court's majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist an-
nounced an intention to follow an "established method of substantive due
process analysis." 33 This alone is striking rhetoric, implicitly acknowledg-
ing a legitimate tradition of extra-textual judicial review in which. the
method is "established." By claiming to identify an "established method"
of review, the majority opinion reaches further: it purports to enunciate a
mode of analysis which both characterizes and justifies the outcomes that
make up this tradition.
In the majority's "established method," determining whether an as-
serted right can be characterized as "fundamental" plays a central role. Ac-
cording to the majority, "special protection" which invokes something be-
yond a demand for rational justification presupposes a "threshold"
determination that the challenged state action implicates a "fundamental
right."3 4 This, in turn, involves two types of showings: that the claim in
question is "objectively deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion"'35 and that it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that
30. Only Justice Stevens could be read as suggesting that the right to refuse treatment is
protected only for the terminally ill. See Glucksberg, 117 S. CL at 2306 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment).
31. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278-79 (1990).
32. See 1 ALANMESEL,THERIGHT TODIE 16-17, 38-41,50 (2d ed. 1995).
33. 117S. Ct. at 2268 & n.17 ("established approach").
34. Id. at2268.
35. Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977)).
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"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. ' 36 Accord-
ing to the majority, in the absence of such showings, the claim in question
can demand only that the government act in a fashion that is rationally re-
lated to legitimate government interests?
7
The claim for assisted suicide fails at this threshold. From the propo-
sition that "a consistent and almost universal tradition... has long rejected
the asserted right and continues explicitly to reject it today,"3 follows the
conclusion that the right did not achieve the status necessary to trigger in-
trusive judicial scrutiny. Thus the opinion merely recites a variety of state
interests, from the "symbolic and aspirational" interest in the preservation
of human life, to a concern for avoiding suicide by those who are depressed
or otherwise vulnerable, to concerns regarding the "time-honored" line in
medical ethics between healing and harming.39 Each is sufficiently rational
to sustain the statute, without investigating their relative strengths.
In sum, according to the majority, absent legislative irrationality,
courts may intervene only to protect those "fundamental rights found to be
deeply rooted in our legal tradition." 40 At one level, this seems quite
straightforward. According to the majority, courts are not empowered to
roam the fields of public policy measuring the acts of government against
their own free-floating sense of morality.41 Rather, the "guideposts" for
exercising intrusive judicial review are to be found in the "Nation's history,
legal traditions, and practices." 42 The Court seeks to preserve ancient Iiber-
36. 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)). Later,
the Court characterizes the relevant activities as those "so deeply rooted in our history and tradi-
tions, or so findamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 2271 (emphasis added).
37. See id. at 2268. The majority also emphasizes that "we have required... a 'careful de-
scription' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." Id. It is hard to know exactly what to
make of this requirement; few lawyers would suggest utilizing sloppy or haphazard descriptions
of legal concepts.
Two bracketing observations are possible. First, the "requirement' is not the same as the
"most specific level" requirement suggested by Justice Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.). A citation to Michael H. is conspicuous in its absence.
Second, there is some suggestion that courts should avoid abstraction. The majority rejects the
claim that what is at issue is "a right to die." It distinguishes Cruzan as an opinion involving a
right to "refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition" or 'medical treatment," and maintains that the
question involved in these cases is whether the Due Process Clause protects a "right to commit
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so." 117 S.Ct. at 2269-70. Elsewhere,
the right is referred to as a liberty interest in "ending one's life with a physician's assistance." Id.
38. Id. at2269.
39. Id. at 2274.
40. Id. at 2268.
41. In this, the majority purports to differ dramatically from Justice Souter's concurrence,
which it accuses of requiring "complex balancing of competing interests in every case." Id. Jus-
tice Souter denies this. See infra text accompanying notes 82-87.
42. 117 S. CL at 2268.
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ties; it guards against the rare innovations or aberrations that threaten long-
standing and deeply rooted values of our society.
The majority's approach explains some of the cases in the substantive
due process canon. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters43 and Meyer v. Ne-
braska,' state legislatures adopted novel regulatory regimes which inter-
fered with traditional parental prerogatives in child-rearing. In Rochin v.
California,45 low-level officials sought to assault the bodily integrity of a
suspect in a fashion repugnant to the common decency imbedded in na-
tional traditions of appropriate law enforcement. At another level, how-
ever, Justice Rehnquist's opinion is deeply mysterious, for in seeking to ar-
ticulate an "established method" of substantive due process analysis, the
majority's approach conspicuously fails to explain another set of cases
which it acknowledges to be part of the canon of substantive due process! 6
The majority's "settled approach" has difficulty accounting for cases
like Eisenstadt v. Baird 47 or Loving v. Virginia s Worse, what the major-
ity refers to as the "established method" cannot encompass the cases which
are most crucially relevant to assisted suicide: Cruzan and Roe itself.
43. 268 U.S. 510, 530-32 (1925).
44. 262 U.S. 390,397-99 (1923).
45. 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952).
46. The approach is also in some tension with cases decided by members of the Glucksberg
majority under other constitutional provisions where the Court overturns legislation which accords
with settled practices, by invoking extra-textual values as has been its wont in recent years. See,
e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (invoking right to electoral districting process in which
race does not "predominate"); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (announcing
right to color blind decision-making by federal government under substantive "equal protection
component" of Due Process Clause); or unwritten "principles" of governmental structure which
have only tangential support in the practices of the constitutional framers. See also Printz v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Seminole Tribev. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 114 (1996).
47. 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (protecting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried cou-
ples).
In the precursor to Eisenstadt, Justice Harlan maintained in Poe v. Ullman that the criminali-
ration of the use of contraceptives by married couples was unprecedented in world history. 367
U.S. 497, 554-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He also noted, however, that on the underlying
question of whether the state could coercively inhibit the distribution and sale of contraceptives
and otherwise inhibit their use, "not too long ago the current of opinion" embodied in governing
statute, was entifely hostile to contraception. Id. at 546 n.12. Moreover, Eisenstadt involved the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried rather than married couples. 405 U.S. at 443.
48. 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (protecting interracial marriages). The definition of who can
engage in marriage, of course, has been traditionally subject to state control, from age limitations
to the definition of incest to the legal monopoly on divorce. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190, 211-12 (1888) (noting that the state may define rights, duties and obligations of married cou-
ples). Miscegenation laws like those Loving overturned go back to the founding of the republic.
See, e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882) (upholding harsher punishment of inter-racial
sexual activities); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 412-15 (1857) (Taney, CJ.) (giving ac-
count of colonial and early American prohibitions on marriage by members of different races).
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The majority characterizes the "right assumed in Cruzan" of "refusing
unwanted [lifesaving] medical treatment" as the fruit of a "long legal tradi-
tion protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment., 49 The
earliest exemplar of the "tradition" of refusing medical treatment that the
Court identified in Cruzan, however, was a case from the late 19th century
which rejected, on procedural grounds, the effort to compel medical exami-
nation of a tort plaintiff.5 While tort law has long viewed unconsented
touchings in general as technical batteries, once a patient submitted to
medical ministrations, the legal scope of patient autonomy was far from
clear during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the common law de-
velopment of informed consent doctrine has been largely an artifact of the
second half of the twentieth centuryl As Justice Scalia pointed out in his
concurrence in Cruzan, there is a common law history both of mandating
life-saving medical treatment and physically interfering with efforts to end
one's life.52 Moreover, the "tradition" in question is strictly a matter of
49. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2270.
50. Union Pao. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), cited in Cruzanr 497 U.S. 261,
269 (1990). The Court's Cruzan opinion referred as well to cases from the 1980s indicating that
"the common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a
competent individual to refuse medical treatment," 497 U.S. at 277. It cited Schloendorffv. Soci-
ety of.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125 (1914), a case which did not involve life-saving treatment, and
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), which in fact allowed compulsory vaccination.
497 U.S. at 278.
51. See Martin S. Pernick, The Patient's Role in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social History
of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3 PRESIDENT'S COMISSION FOR STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINF, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECIsIONS (1982); JAY KATZ, THE
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); RUTH R. FADEN, Er AL, A HIsToRY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 79 (1986) (providing account of 19th century doctor taking re-
sponsibility for decision not to amputate patient's leg without informing patient); id. at 74 (argu-
ing that rudimentary consent-seeking in surgery during the 18th and 19th century was not based in
respect for patient's autonomy, but on "practical and clinical necessity."); id. at 117 (observing
that 18th century courts recognized tort only if medical experts testified that seeking consent was
an "ordinary and beneficial part of medical therapy."); id. at 123-25 (describing controversy about
scope of consent requirement).
52. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 297-98 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing John F. Kennedy Mem'l
Hosp. v. Heston, 58 NJ. 576 (1971)); Application of President & Dirs. of Georgetown College,
Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Indeed, if the common law right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment was as well established as the Glucksberg majority makes it out to be, it is hard to
fathom why the doctors in Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976)-which the Court in Quill characterized
as "the first state-court decision explicitly to authorize withdrawing lifesaving treatment," 117 S.
Ct. at 2299--could claim that their "existing medical standards" precluded withdrawal of the res-
pirator. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 666 (holding that refusal to order withdrawal of respirator was
proper "under the law as it then stood").
Justice Stevens' concurrence highlights the fact that the evolution toward the right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment has been an evolution away from the common-law equilibrium. 117 S.
Ct. at 2306 ("We have recognized, however, that this common-law right to refuse treatment is
neither absolute nor always sufficiently weighty to overcome valid countervailing state inter-
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common law. As the same Justices who comprised the Glucksberg major-
ity were at pains to point out in another case this Term, society's interest in
avoiding danger "to self or others" has traditionally justified a legislature in
overriding protected interests in avoiding medical treatment.53
Recently, a substantial social and legal consensus has developed that
allows competent patients a virtually untrammeled right to refuse life-
saving medical treatments.54 But this consensus emerged in the last two
decades; it is hardly a subsisting tradition from the legal regime of the
Founding or Reconstruction, when medical treatment was itself a far
chancier and less efficacious enterprise. If this counts as a "deeply rooted
tradition," roots grow quickly indeed, and the justification for judicial in-
tervention must be phrased in terms of an evolving social consensus rather
than an aspiration to retain traditional liberties. This is not necessarily a
bad thing, but it is not what the majority purports to be doing when it keys
analysis to "traditional liberties."'
The gap between the methodology articulated by the majority as a
means of identifying "fundamental" liberties and the constellation of liber-
ties it accepts as fundamental, moreover, grows to a yawning chasm when
the Glucksberg majority confronts Roe and Casey. The burden of the cur-
rent doctrine on abortion, as the majority articulates it, is "that a woman
has a right, before her fetus is viable, to an abortion 'without undue inter-
ference from the state."' 56 Yet, as Justice Rehnquist stressed in his dissents
in Casey and Roe, that right did not reflect the legal tradition of the
Founding or Reconstruction. At common law, abortion after quickening
was thought to be a crime; by the time of the framing of the Fourteenth
ests .... In most ases,... the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment will give way to the
State's interest in preserving human life.).
53. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2074 (1997) (upholding confinement that was
arguably necessary to treat mental abnormality and to protect the public from sexual predators
(citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26 (approving mandatory vaccination))). Cf. Botsford, 141 U.S. at
252-53 (recognizing that right of bodily autonomy may be overridden in proceedings of public
import including divorce and criminal proceedings).
54. See I ALANMEISEL, THERIGHTTO DIE 37-77 (2ded. 1995).
55. At some points, the majority opinion flirts with the notion of an evolving consensus. In
setting the scene for its legal discussion, Justice Rehnquist lays out not only the common law his-
tory of the prohibitions of suicide but the contemporary political debate, 117 S. Ct. at 2265-67,
and concludes that after "serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide.., we
have not retreated from this prohibition." Ide at 2267. (By "we," Chief Justice Rehnquist pre-
sumably does not mean the Supreme Court, but the people of the United States).
So, too, the majority's introductory discussion highlights "history, tradition and practice."
Id. (emphasis added). A bit later, the majority describes "our Nation's history, legal traditions,
and practices" as the "crucial guideposts" in substantive due process decision-making. Id. at
2268 (emphasis added) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); see also
117 S. Ct. at 2268 n.17. What is not clear is whether current practice can merely negate an oth-
erwise "rooted" historical tradition, or whether it can germinate roots itself.
56. 117 S. Ct. at 2270 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)).
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Amendment, abortion at any stage of pregnancy had been legislatively pro-
hibited in 28 of the 37 states, and by the beginning of the twentieth century,
every state prohibited abortion. It is, as Justice Rehnquist has quite
rightly noted for a quarter century, difficult to say that a "deeply rooted tra-
dition of relatively unrestricted abortion in our history supported the classi-
fication of the right to abortion as 'fundamental."' 58 Indeed, unlike the
emerging trend toward a state-level right to refuse treatment at the time of
Cruzan,59 free availability of abortion at the time of Roe was distinctly a
minority position,60 so that the Court's intervention could not even be justi-
fied as protecting an evolving consensus "tradition" of recent vintage.
At the core of the Glucksberg majority's opinion, therefore, is an un-
resolved contradiction. On one hand, the majority purports to accept abor-
tion as part of the legitimate landscape of substantive due process, and to
explain that landscape on the basis of an "established method." On the
other hand, the historical test which the Court uses as a way of avoiding the
normative argument that assisted suicide is a "fundamental right" works
equally well to block the most important parts of the doctrine which the
Court claims to accept.
It is possible, of course, that in the "established method," history sim-
ply has a veto, rather than a determinative vote. The majority's analysis
begins with the question "whether this asserted right has any place in our
Nation's traditions,"61 and, finding a "consistent [continuing] and almost
universal tradition" of rejection, it concludes that the right cannot be con-
57. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, CJ, dissenting, joined by White, Scalia, and
Thomas, JJ.); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174-75 (1973) (Rehnquist, L, dissenting).
58. Casey, 505 U.S. at 952-53 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 175.
(Rehnquist, ., dissenting).
The nod in the Glucksberg opinion toward Roe's statement that from the Founders to the
19th century "wom[en] enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy" hardly
provides a basis for protecting post-quickening abortions. See 117 S. Ct. at 2271 n.19 (quoting
Roe, 410 U.S. at 140). The majority's history in Roe discloses that such abortions were held by
most authorities to be illegal at common law, and illegal by statute from the mid 19th century.
410 U.S. at 133-34. Nor does it account for the fact that this broader availability was displaced at
the end of the 19th century by virtually universal prohibition.
59. 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (observing that "cases involving the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment have burgeoned" in the decade before the decision and reviewing major lines
of authority); id. at 290-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reviewing legislation on health care prox-
ies).
60. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 49-51 (1990)
(most existing reforms "hardly increased access to abortion"; New York's permissive law hung by
a thread); Id. at 140 (only New York was unaffected by the ruling); see also GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 184 (1990) (New York, Washington, Hawaii, and Alaska had
repealed abortion laws; all but New York had residency requirements).
61. 117 S. Ct. at 2269.
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sidered a "fundamental" one.62 By the time the majority opinion reaches its
discussion of Casey, its account of the activities the Court has protected is
phrased in the disjunctive as those "so deeply rooted in our history and tra-
ditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered lib-
erty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 63 This could
offer a way out of the contradiction. Perhaps the rights recognized in Roe
and Cruzan need only be "fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty."
While not "deeply rooted," they are at least not at odds with a "consistent
and almost universal tradition."
64
But this escape comes at a high price to the restrained role the Gucks-
berg majority seeks to adopt. The "established methodology" of due proc-
ess becomes simply a requirement that, where the right in question has not
been consistently rejected throughout American history, the Court thinks
hard about the meaning of the "concept of ordered liberty."
IV. The Constitution and the Common Lawyer: Souter's
Concurrence
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion purports to use history to define
the metes and bounds of unenumerated rights; it strives to constrain judicial
intervention. But the boundaries it establishes are too narrow to encompass
the prior cases it seeks to explain. Justice Souter's concurrence, by con-
trast, can explain almost any judicial intervention: he embraces a system in
which judges are responsible to evaluate all government actions, in the
form of what he calls "arbitrariness review."6 -5 Although the prohibition of
assisted suicide is sustainable, according to Justice Souter it is because that
prohibition is, on its moral merits, not an "arbitrary" one.
There is something enormously refreshing about reading an opinion by
a Justice who is unashamed in his celebration of substantive due process in
the teeth of scholarly and judicial criticism of the doctrine. Calling upon
62. Id. at 2269-71. Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) ("[Ll]ong-
standing and still extant societal tradition withholding the very right pronounced" was not present
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). The Court in Michael H. argued that such a
tradition precludes the classification of the right as 'Tundamental" Id.
63. 117 S. Ct. at2271.
64. l at 2269.
65. Id. at2279,2280 (Souter, 3., concurring).
Like Justice Souter, Justice Stevens' position in his separate concurrence allows the Court to
critically evaluate state interests in areas that impact on basic freedom in matters "central to dig-
nity and autonomy," at least in relation to "making decisions about how to confront imminent
death:' Id. at 2307 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 229). Since his analysis does not add much to
his earlier opinion in Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 351-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting), I treat Justice Stevens's
Glucksberg analysis only in passing.
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the second Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Vllman66 as his model, Justice
Souter invokes "two centuries of American constitutional practice in rec-
ognizing unenumerated, substantive limits on governmental action"67 to
support a judicial role of protecting the "rights to be free from 'arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints' imposed by the government in any
area. 68 Unfortunately, to be refreshed is not necessarily to be persuaded.
A. Text, Tradition and Self Government
No one is likely to argue in favor of "arbitrary impositions" and "pur-
poseless restraints" on the basis of their intrinsic merits. Certain long-stan-
ding doubts nonetheless persist about the source of the federal judiciary's
authority to supplant what it regards as "arbitrary" political actions, in the
absence of a textual mandate in the Constitution. Justice Souter does not
say a great deal to allay those doubts.
Justice Souter claims to be impelled by an obligation "to construe con-
stitutional text and review legislation for conformity to that text[,]"69 but
his argument in this respect is baffling. Quoting Justice Harlan's Poe dis-
sent, he notes that "[w]ere due process merely a procedural safeguard it
would fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or
property was accomplished by legislation which.., could... nevertheless
destroy the enjoyment of all three."70 This is an accurate account of a
strictly procedural due process, but it gives no indication of why the con-
stitutional text requires anything else.
The judicial obligation to police "arbitrary impositions" could rest on
political postulates about the impropriety of absolute legislative suprem-
acy7' or of actions taken without appropriate grounding in the public inter-
est.72 It might ground itself on a belief that the Constitution presupposes a
modicum of basic morality as a prerequisite to regarding legislative enact-
ments as "law."73 But Justice Souter does not make these arguments, or
even allude to them.
66. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
67. 117 S.Ct. at 2277.
68. Id. at 2282 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
69. Id. at 2281.
70. Id. (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, ., dissenting)).
71. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387-88 (1798) (Chase, J.) ("I cannot subscribe to
the omnipotence of a state Legislature, or that it is absolute and without control."); cf 117 S. Ct.
2281 n.7 (Souter, J., concurring) ( "[Uf it does not necessarily import this, then the legislative
power is absolute.").
72. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689 (1984).
73. Cf. Randy Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Rights in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 12 CONST. COMME TARY 96 (1995) (arguing that in order to be legitimately binding stat-
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The closest Justice Souter comes to justifying "arbitrariness review' is
his repeated reference to a "tradition" of judicial intervention "which has
never been repudiated in principle. 74 If common law judges are entitled to
rely on an unbroken line of practice in the execution of their office, he
seems to suggest, constitutional judges can do likewise. Such a tradition
could draw on the support of Burkean claims about social stability and the
wisdom of accumulated experience, the role of continuity in the common
law process, and a desire not to disappoint the expectations of citizens who
have come to rely on the courts as a backstop against the potential excesses
of the political branches." Indeed, such a tradition, if widely accepted,
could constitute what Cass Sunstein has recently referred to as an "incom-
pletely theorized agreement," 76 supported by the convergence of a series of
potential justifications.
Unfortunately, Justice Souter believes that the tradition in question
begins with Dred SCott,77 and encompasses Lochner.7s These are hardly
cases which command broad support; a tradition that includes them is one
whose claim to a principled allegiance from large parts of the legal or gen-
eral community is in serious dispute.79 Where Justices O'Connor and
utes, they must bejust, andjudges have an obligation to review statutes for their consistency with
the rights specified by justice).
My own suspicion is that the natural law idea that immoral and arbitrary enactments cannot
be legitimately considered to be "law" is the best account of a connection between the Due Proc-
ess Clause and the review that Justice Souter proposes. Cf. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388 (Chase, J.) ("An
act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social
compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.").
74. 117 S. Ct. at 2280 ("tradition of substantive due process review... [and] the Judiciary's
obligation to carry it on"); id. at 2281 ("enduring tradition of American constitutional practice?).
75. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CH. L. REV.
877 (1996); ef Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952) (citing Edmund Burke).
76. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely TheorizedAgreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1737
(1995).
77. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
78. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
79. Justice Souter claims to avoid the mistakes of Dred Scott and Lochner by repudiating the
use of"extratextual absolutes." 117 S. Ct. at 2281. See also id. at 2279 (cases in Lochner line
"invoked a correct standard of constitutional arbitrariness review, [but] harbored the spirit of
Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation:').
It is hard to say much about Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott, since his entire due
process analysis is contained in a.single sentence: "[A]n Act of Congress which deprives a citi-
zen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offense
against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law." 60 U.S. at 450
(Taney, CJ.) For myself, I find a certain cryptic moral obtuseness, but can discern no peculiarly
"absolutist" approach here, for everything turns on what is an "offense against the laws."
In his characterization of the Lochner era, Justice Souter lapses into dubious history, for it
was precisely a willingness to evaluate the relative weights of claims of public policy and private
right that led the Lochner era courts to respond to the Brandeis briefs. Rights of property and
contract were not regarded as absolute; courts upheld a vast array of health and safety regulations.
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Breyer invoke norms that can claim wide support the potentially unlimited
character of "arbitrariness review" combined with its noxious past robs it
of a claim to consensus.
B. The Method of "Arbitrariness Review"
Whatever the deficiencies in the justifications Justice Souter provides
for "arbitrariness review," it is worth trying to understand exactly how it
works, for this could illuminate its legitimacy.
As a general matter, Justice Souter embraces the obligation of judges
to examine the "relative 'weights' or dignities of contending interests. "
80
When the resolution reached by the political branches "falls outside the
realm of the reasonable," the judiciary is obligated to invalidate the act in
question as unconstitutional.8 '
Justice Souter does not contemplate an entirely unrestrained judicial
recalibration of the balance between public interest and private right.
During the Lochner era, the cases in which the Court sustained health, safety and welfare
lgislation far outnumber the cases where the legislation was invalidated. See CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 92-82, at 1362-63 (1973) (listing regulations of medicine, den-
tistry, pilots, railroad engineers, grain elevators, detectives, cigarettes, cosmetics, junk dealers,
and others upheld against substantive due process attacks). Regulations of storage of gasoline,
public laundries, wooden buildings, and similar activities were upheld, as were regulations re-
garding garbage, food, drugs, and cosmetics. See id. at 1368, 1370-71.
. Lochner itself invalidated limitations on hours of bakers (though it affirmed the viability of
limitations on working conditions). 198 U.S. at 64. But the Court had previously upheld limita-
tions on the hours of miners, see, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898), and subse-
quently upheld hours limitations for women, see, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23
(1908). Cf. Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915);
Riley v. Mass. 232 U.S. 671 (1914). Ultimately, even the ten-hour day struck down when limited
to bakers inLochner itself was held to avoid "arbitrariness" when applied to all workers. Bunting
v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426,438-39 (1917).
Again, it is possible to construct a stronger case for a tradition of extra-textual review, be-
ginning with the popular assumptions about unenumerated rights in the founding generation and
the framing of the Ninth Amendment, see, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Umvritten Con-
stitution, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 1127 (1987), and running through early Marshall Court opinions
(which Souter in fact cites at 117 S. Ct. at 2278), to anti-slavery jurisprudence and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. Professor Black's work is perhaps the most elegant recent attempt. See
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN PIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED
(1997). But Justice Souter does not do this. He relies simply on an observation of what the Su-
preme Court has periodically done and said.
80. 117 S. Ct. at 2281, 2283 ('Mlhe business of such review is ... [to weigh] clashing prin-
ciples... within the history of our values as a people. It is a comparison of the relative strengths
of opposing claims that informs the judicial task."). "The kind and degree ofjustification that a
sensitive judge would demand of a State would depend on the importance of the interest being
asserted by the individual." Id. at 2280.
81. Id. at 2281. "[W]hen the legislation's justifying principle, critically valued, is so far
from being commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied
... the statute must give way." Id. at 2283.
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Rather, the approach he advocates would apparently begin with an evalua-
tion of the "constitutional stature" of the private claim at stake.s2 In the
absence of a threshold showing of an interest "sufficiently important to be
judged 'fundamental',.0 3 judicial review is cursory. "At relatively trivial
levels" of statutory imposition, the government's action84 is to be sustained
unless "governmental restraints are undeniably irrational as unsupported by
any imaginable rationale."85 On the other hand, for values recognized to be
truly deserving of constitutional stature, a state may infringe on the private
interest only if the state's 'justifying principle" is sufficiently "commensu-
rate with the individual interest that the legislation is not "arbitrarily or
pointlessly applied"8 6 Such situations are, Justice Souter assures us,
"suitably rare"; in making this judgment, moreover, the courts are obliged
to defer to balances which are "within the zone of reasonableness."
' 8
Thus, Justice Souter contemplates two working steps: courts must
identify the "constitutional stature" of the individual interests asserted, and
then determine whether the state's 'justifying principle" is reasonably
"commensurate" with the interests.88 This may sound like cost-benefit bal-
ancing, but it apparently is not. In making each judgment, according to
Justice Souter, the judge is obliged to use the "common law method" and
the "usual canons of critical discourse."89 In particular, the judge is to use
a series of "new examples and new counterexamples[,]" and compare the
case at hand with those which have gone before.90
Each step is problematic.
82. Id
83. Id. at 2282,2283 n.9.
84. Justice Souter regularly writes of the review of "legislation," but then interpolates cita-
tions to the review of administrative actions. See, e.g., 117 S. Ct. at 2283 (citing Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1982)). As my colleague Matt Adler has recently written, there
are strong reasons to believe that the legitimaoy of wide-ranging judicial review may be stronger
where the actions are those of administrative agencies. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint
in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759
(1997). And as I have suggested elsewhere, the great bulk of constitutional intervention by the
judiciary occurs in non-legislative arenas. Seth F. Kreimer Exploring the Dark Matter of Judi-
cial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL OFRTs. J. 427 (1997).
85. 117 S. Ct at 2282.
86. Id at 2283. A state "may prevail only on the ground of an interest sufficiently compel-
ling to place within the realm of the reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right as-
serted." IHL at 2282.
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1. Identifying "Certain Interests"
In determining the "weight or dignity" of the individual interest as-
serted, Justice Souter clearly does not mean the court should simply evalu-
ate whether the interest is important to the individual asserting it, or to the
reasonable person in the individual's position. Carolene Products Corpo-
ration, after all, could have been put out of business by the challenged fed-
eral legislation, but Justice Souter characterizes the company's interest as
"trivial."91 Rather, Justice Souter maintains that in determining the
"weight" of the interest asserted, the court is obliged to limit its recognition
to those values "truly deserving constitutional stature, either to those ex-
pressed in constitutional text, or those exemplified by 'the traditions from
which [the Nation] developed', or [those] revealed by contrast with 'the
traditions from which it broke."' 92
Taken on its own terms, this is not much of a limitation. The "values
expressed in the constitutional text" are capacious. Both Due Process
Clauses, after all, protect "life, liberty, and property." After augmenting
these clearly expressed textual values with the Founders' regard for "the
pursuit of happiness," and the enumeration of "fundamental" privileges and
immunities in Corfield v. Coryel,93 it is difficult identify a serious interest
that would not rise to "constitutional stature," even without a reference to
other "traditions."
But, read charitably, Justice Souter may be saying that text and his-
torical practice simply provide the raw materials that courts must work with
to evaluate the "fundamentality" of the interests in question. Not every ef-
fort to pursue happiness need be regarded as fundamental, but only those
that the Court through the "common law method" concludes play a crucial
role in the American polity. 94 In this case, apparently, the "common law
method" is one of reasoning by analogy.
Justice Souter gives as a parade example of the way in which the pro-
cess should work his account of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe. According
to Justice Souter, the Harlan dissent used the common law method to as-
certain that marital contraceptive use was encompassed within the "certain
91. Id. at2282.
92. Id at 2383 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542 (1961)).
93. 6 F. Cas. 546,551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230) ("[p]rotection by the government;
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and posses property of every kind, and
to pursue and obtain happiness and safety"). Justice Souter cites Justice Harlan's invocation of
Corfield as a proper example of a court identifying "fundamental" rights. 117S. Ct. at 2282.
94. Justice Souter is fond of the "common law method.' He uses the phrase no fewer than
four times in two pages. See 117 S. Ct. at 2283-84.
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interests requir[ing] particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted
to justify their abridgment."
95
Seeking to employ the same method, Justice Souter argues in Gluck-
berg that the "liberty interest in bodily integrity" has been recognized in the
common law of battery which prohibits medical invasions and forced
medication, the constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, and
the constitutional right against government prohibitions of medical aid in
obtaining an abortion, as well as the "high value traditionally placed on the
medical relationship," and the authorization by many states to administer
analgesic medication which may hasten death.96 He concludes that the
"importance of the individual interest here... cannot be gainsaid."
97
All of this may be quite sensible reasoning by analogy, if the question
were presented to a common law court whether assisted suicide should be a
tort or a common law crime. But the state of Washington has already exer-
cised its legislative power to pre-empt common law decision-making, and,
as Justice Marshall defined the Court's duty in such cases, "it is a constitu-
tion we are expounding. 98 I like a good analogy as well as the next law
professor, but is assisted suicide appropriately analogized to abortion, the
use of psychoactive drugs, wearing long hair, body piercing, or murder?
What Justice Souter has not done is to identify how the analogies he
chooses map into the Court's constitutional mandate. 99
Inspired by Justice Souter, I went back to re-read Justice Harlan's Poe
dissent, and alas, it appears that Justice Souter does not quite live up to the
model he invokes. Justice Harlan does begin his Poe dissent with the
proposition that Souter quotes: that in assaying a law's congruence with
the "balance our nation has struck between... liberty and the demands of
organized society[,] ... certain interests require particularly careful scru-
tiny of state needs asserted to justify their abridgement."'
00
To identify those interests, however, Justice Harlan looks not simply
to historical or common law practice in America, but to the purposes he
95. Id. at 2282.
96. Id. at 2287-88.
97. Id. at 2290.
98. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 U.S. (I Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
99. This uncritical importation of the "common law method" into constitutional adjudication
is particularly mystifying given Justice Souter's strong account last Term of the "Framer's [fear
of] judicial power over substantive policy and the ossification of law that would result from trans-
forming common law into constitutional law." Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114, 1176 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
100. 367 U.S. at 543.
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discerns in the Constitution itself.10 1 True, Justice Harlan adopts the
proposition that the "the privacy of the home ... by common understanding
throughout the English speaking world, must be granted to be a most fun-
damental aspect of 'liberty."' 02 But, he does not rest with an account of
Anglophone public opinion; he argues in support of the proposition that
this protection of the home is a part of ihe purposes of the Constitution.
Beginning with the Third and Fourth Amendments' protections
against quartering troops and unreasonably searching the home, Justice
Harlan argues that "the rational purposes, historical roots and subsequent
development of the relevant provisions" support the constitutional protec-
tion of privacies within the home. 0 3 Because the constitutional protection
constitutes a "rational continuum,"10 4 the Court is entitled to look to other
constitutional provisions and constructions in elaborating a non-textual
protection that coheres with the remainder of the Constitution. The Court
can legitimately claim to be exercising its warrant of construing the Con-
stitution because the basic building blocks come from the Constitution it-
self.105 This is precisely what Justice Souter's use of "the common law
method" fails to do.1
0 6
101. See Id. at 544 ("Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be cofisidered against
a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and historically
developed.").
Again, in defining the importance of the principles of free speech, "[i]t is the purposes of
those guarantees and not their text, the reasons for their statement by the Framers and not the
statement itself, which have led to their present status." Ido (internal citations omitted).
102. Id. at 548.
103. Id. at 550. Harlan's account begins with Justice Brandeis's vision of the purposes of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments as embodying the "right to be let alone"; it continues through the
"sweep of the Court's decisions" under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to conclude that
"the home [which is the subject of Fourth Amendment protection] derives its preeminence as the
seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been
found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional
right." Id. at 550-52.
104. Id. at 543.
105. The protection of liberties by this methodology is, in Harlan's use, constrained by his-
torical common law practice; "intimacies which the law has always forbidden and which can have
no claim to social protection" cannot claim protection of the Constitution under Harlan's princi-
ple. Id. at 553. The impetus for protection, however must come from the constitutional tapestry.
See id.
106. I am not at all sure that a truly Harlanesque argument could be constructed for a consti-
tutionally dignified right of access to medical assistance in committing suicide. Medical care it-
self has long been a regulated and regulable activity. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia. 129 U.S.
114, 121-22 (1889) (upholding constitutionality of medical licensing); see also United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (upholding constitutionality of federal drug regulation prohibit-
ing laetrile for use by terminally ill cancer patients). And the right to avoid government impinge-
ments on bodily welfare has been recognized, almost exclusively outside of the abortion cases and
in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), as a right against the government's active intrusion on
bodily integrity.
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2. "Relative Weights of Contending Interests"
Assuming that a right of "constitutional stature" has been identified by
the "common law method," the second step of Justice Souter's analysis re-
quires the Court to determine whether the state's '"justifying principle" is
arbitrarily incommensurate with the imposition. I0 7 This is not the place to
rehearse the on-going barrage of criticism that has been directed at the pro-
cess of "weighing" individual liberties against state interests in defining
constitutional rights. I08 Again, charitably construed, Justice Souter does
not necessarily require courts to finely evaluate the relative importance of
the contending interests at the margins. Rather, he claims that the Court's
only role is to identify a disproportion between the state's claims and those
of the individual so great as to be described as "arbitrary"; only such arbi-
trary disproportions justify judicial intervention. Any interest that could
reasonably be judged to be of a magnitude comparable to the one infringed
will be adequate. Giving Justice Souter the further benefit of his invoca-
tion of Justice Harlan and the "common law method," it is further possible
to define this "arbitrariness review" not in terms of the independent judg-
ment of the Court in a particular instance, but in terms of a comparison
between the tradeoff at issue here and those which have been sanctioned
elsewhere in constitutional jurisprudence or settled tradition.'09
Having determined that the interest of terminal patients in obtaining
medical assistance in ending their lives is constitutionally "important,"
Justice Souter nonetheless concludes that the interest in maintaining a sys-
The strongest argument seems to me the claim of spiritual integrity of the sort advanced by
Justice Stevens, but to the extent that objections are keyed to consequentialist dangers, it is hard to
invoke this claim with sufficient force.
107. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2283.
108. For classic attacks, see, for example, Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv.
865 (1960); Laurent B. Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J 1424, 1441-50
(1962); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51
CAL. L. REV. 729, 746-48 (1963); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943 (1987); C. Edwin Baker, Unseasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory
Parade Permits and Time, Place and Manner Regulation, 78 NW. U. L. REv. 937 (1983); Anto-
nin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Mark Tushnet,
Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1502 (1985).
I have elsewhere argued that the attacks are, for some rights, misdirected. See Seth F. Kre-
imer, Sunlight, Secrets and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in
ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 108-42 (1991).
109. By analogy, for Justice Harlan, the balance in question is not one reached by independent
judicial evaluation, but "the balance which our Nation.:. has struck between liberty and the de-
mands of organized society." Poe, 367 U.S. at 542. "The balance of which I speak is the balance
struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it de-
veloped as well as the traditions from which it broke:' Id At the point that he actually evaluated
the balance in Poe, the decisive consideration for Justice Harlan was the "utter novelty of the en-
actment," the fact that in the nation as a whole, no other governmental entity had applied a crimi-
nal prohibition directly to marital use of contraceptives. Id. at 554.
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tern which "protect[s] terminally ill patients from involuntary suicide and
euthanasia, both voluntary and non-voluntary," is adequate to justify the
state's prohibition. 10 As Justice Souter constructs the argument, this is not
a hard call.
Justice Souter puts to one side the state's claim of an interest in pro-
tecting life generally, or of discouraging knowing and voluntary suicides,
suggesting that "a moral judgment contrary to respondent's" may not be
adequate to the task of counterbalancing the interests invoked."' Rather,
he relies on the "dispositive" weight of the potential dangers of mistaken or
involuntary suicide and euthanasia.112  The decision to prohibit assisted
suicide need not rest on morally controverted grounds, for, according to the
states which defend the laws, a system which permits assisted suicide will
likewise entail the risk of lethal abuse and mistake. "[M]istaken decisions
may result from inadequate palliative care or a terminal prognosis that turns
out to be error; coercion and abuse may stem from the large medical bills
that family members cannot bear or unreimbursed hospitals decline to
shoulder."'" 3 A system which allows assisted suicide provides some citi-
zens with a desired end to a painful and debilitated life, according to Jus-
tice Souter, but puts others at risk of having their life ended against their
will. The state cannot grant release to some without imposing danger on
others, and no one doubts the state's interest in protecting all of its citizens
from being killed involuntarily.
In this tragic balance, according to Justice Souter, the importance of"a
State's interest in protecting those unable to make responsible decisions
and those who make no decisions at all" against the termination of their
lives "is beyond question";" 4 it is of a quality commensurate with the in-
terests that prohibition infringes. On the empirical question of the magni-
tude of the risk in question, Justice Souter professes to be agnostic, but in
the absence of a clear showing that the risk is minimal, he is unwilling to
say that the legislature has acted arbitrarily."
5




114. Id. at 2292.
115. "The day may come when we can say with some assurance which side is right, but for
now it is the substantiality of the factual disagreement, and the alternatives for resolving it, that
matter... Mhe basic concept ofjudicial review... bars any finding that a legislafture has acted
arbitrarily when... there is a serious factual controversy over the feasibility of recognizing the
claimed right without at the same time maldng it impossible for the State to engage in an undoubt-
edly legitimate exercise of power, facts necessary to resolve the controversy are not readily as-
certainable through the judicial process; but they are more readily subject to discovery through
legislative factfinding and experimentation." IR
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At one level, I can have no objection to this analysis, since it tracks
one that I have previously suggested." 6 At another level, however, Justice
Souter is misleading when he suggests that the key rests in a "legislature's
superior opportunities to obtain the facts necessary for a judgment about
the present controversy," or that "facts currently unknown could be dis-
-positive," and goes on to intimate that "legislative foot-dragging in ascer-
taining the facts" could form the basis for judicial intervention."
7
Certainly, constitutional analysis must start with the facts. The plain-
tiffs before the Court suffered pain and physical debilitation; there is every
reason to expect that their situations were not unique." 8 On the other hand,
it is also clear that in the experiment with legalization of assisted suicide in
the Netherlands, some patients have been subjected to life ending interven-
tions "without explicit request,"" 9 and there is every reason to expect an
American experiment to prove at least equally problematic.
It is possible that a consensus will emerge that all physical pain can be
medically addressed, and the legalization in Holland or Oregon (should it
survive) will prove so extensively and unambiguously lethal that the justifi-
cation for prohibition will be placed beyond question. Conversely, legali-
zation could go so smoothly that it will become utterly clear that there are
no dangers of collateral consequences, and prohibition of assisted suicide is
utterly without justification aside from moral opposition. 120 But for any-
thing between these extremes, facts are unlikely to resolve the matter of
constitutional mandate.
12 1
First, consider the dangers attending legalization. Suppose that reli-
able estimates are available which would lead any legislator to conclude
legalization of assisted suicide will lead to the death of only 10 individuals
116. See Kreimer, supra note 12.
117. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2293.
118. See, e.g., J. Addington-Hall et al., Dyingfrom Cancer: Results of an National Popula-
tion-based Investigation, 9 PALLIATIVE MEDICINE 295 (1995) (1/3 of terminal cancer patients
experience great pain); Joanne Lynn, M.D., et al., Perceptions by Family Members of the Dying
Experience of Older and Seriously 111 Patients, 126 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED 97 (1997) (55%
of all patients surveyed spent the last three days of their life conscious and in pain); SUPPORT
Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients, 274
JAMA 1591, 1594 (1995) (50% of terminal patients in study who died in hospital experienced
moderate or severe pain at least half of the time during their last 3 days of life).
119. Glucksberg, 117S. Ct at2291-92.
120. For Justice Harlan, whom Justice Souter claims as a model;moral opposition could be an
adequate basis for most exercises of the police power. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
Justice Souter, however, may be inclined to conclude that unadorned moral judgments are not
adequate to justify the particularly burdensome laws at issue here without more. Such a principle
certainly couldjustify the outcomes in Roe and Casey.
121. This is not to say that facts may not be of importance to policy-makers seeking to choose
among the wide spectrum of constitutionally acceptable policies.
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per year in circumstances that are not substantially competent, informed
and voluntary. Suppose that it can be reliably shown that there are no other
dynamic effects. At the same time, suppose that equally reliable estimates
suggest that 1000 individuals who would honestly and legitimately see
death as a release from physical and spiritual agony will be able to escape
those circumstances every year because of the legalization of physician as-
sisted suicide. Would a legislative choice to retain the prohibition be un-
constitutionally "arbitrary"?
The answer turns not on the facts that the legislature finds, but on the
values it is entitled to embody in law. According to one recent report, 69
people in the last quarter century have been released from death row be-
cause they were later found to be factually innocent.'2 For opponents of
the death penalty this seems strong evidence that the penalty is unaccept-
able, even if it has a deterrent impact on murders in a much larger number
of cases. Even if one disagrees with that judgment-which I do not-it
would be hard to characterize it as "arbitrary." The crucial moral issue is
not how many lives are at issue on each side, but the evaluation of the rela-
tive moral import of saving innocent lives by deterrence and risking taking
them by official act.
So too with assisted suicide. When comparing the risk of a small
number of involuntary deaths with the benefit of a large number of escapes
from suffering it is not enough to count bodies. Plausible moral judgments
could claim that death is incalculably worse than suffering, 12 or that the
distributional consequences of imposing a risk of death which falls most
heavily on the least advantaged members of society outweighs the cost to a
broader class of relatively privileged individuals who will feel a loss of
dignity in their last days. 124 Moreover, countervailing and plausible inde-
terminate concerns point to potential second and third order effects on the
medical profession, the willingness of the victims of debilitating disease to
seek to endure rather than escape, the incentives to improve palliative care,
and the regard for the terminally ill. None of these issues are likely to be
factually determinate.
122. Richard C. Dieter, Innocence and the Death Penalty: The Increasing Danger of Exe-
cuting the Innocent (visited March 22, 1998) <http'//www.essential.orgtorgsldpie/inn.html>.
123. Compare Alastair Norcross, Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives, 26 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFAIS 135 (1997) (discussing arguments for and against sacrificing lives to avoid suf-
fering) with Larry S. Temkin, A Continuum Argument for lntransitivity, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS
175, 191 (1996) (arguing that the sacrifice of lives to avoid suffering is immoral).
124. White men tend to view risks as systematically lower and more acceptable than females
and non-whites. James Flynn et al., Gender, Race, and Perception of Environmental Health
Risks, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1101, 1102 (1994).
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Once countervailing considerations are qualitatively commensurate
with the suffering that attends prohibition, legislatures are entitled to the
final word in resolving these dilemmas. They are entitled, not because they
are better fact-finders than courts, but because within broad constitutional
constraints popularly elected legislators are entitled to exercise independent
moral judgment. No factual developments are likely to change this.
The same is, of course, true on the other side. If it turns out that only
10 Americans must live for 10 days each every year in physical agony as a
price of a prohibition that saves 1000 depressed or vulnerable Americans
from being induced to end their lives without full and voluntary consent,
one might conclude that a cost-benefit accounting requires prohibition. But
a legislative detremination that a commitment to individual liberty in mat-
ters of high moral import dominates the need to protect the vulnerable from
potential misuse of that liberty could not be condemned as arbitrary. This
is so, not because the legislature is a "better fact finder" than the Court, but
because its value commitments are constitutionally legitimate.
V. Constitutional Law as Common Decency
If Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter's opinions were the only ones
in Glucksberg, an observer might be justified in concluding that substantive
due process analysis has lost its germinal potential, and that the abortion
cases maintain what vitality they have only by grace of stare decisis. But
Justice Rehnquist wrote for only four of his fellow Justices, and one of
those-Justice O'Connor-filed a concurrence. Justice O'Connor, as the
senior author of the joint plurality of Casey, seems more likely to success-
fully reconcile the abortion cases and Glucksberg than Justice Rehnquist
who, after all, was not enamored of Roe from the beginning. In addition to
joining the Glucksberg majority, Justice O'Connor authored a separate
brief and somewhat cryptic concurrence, which drew the adherence of Jus-
tices Ginsburg and Breyer. Together with the concurrence of Justice
Breyer, Justice O'Connor's opinion bears the seeds of a persuasive synthe-
sis of Casey and Glucksberg.
A. The Abortion and Gender: A Road Not Taken
The Casey plurality brought to the fore the importance of gender to the
analysis of abortion. The link between control of reproductive capacity and
the capacity to transcend traditional gender roles appeared several times in
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the joint opinion's analysis.'2 I have argued elsewhere that one basis for
distinguishing abortion from assisted suicide is abortion's special salience
for women. 2 6 Unlike a prohibition on abortion, a prohibition on assisted
suicide does not require any definable social group in the population to
bear a concentrated burden for the benefit of society's moral choices. Nor
does it threaten to lock members of a previously subordinated group into a
set of social roles to which they have been relegated in the past by societal
expectations.
The analysis of gender is largely absent, however, from the discussion
in Glucksberg. Justice O'Connor's concurrence gives the general issue of
equality attention in the following fashion:
Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family
member's terminal illness. There is no reason to think the democratic
process will not strike the proper balance between the interests of termi-
nally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end their
suffering and the State's interests in protecting those who might seek to
end life mistakenly or under pressure.
Given the facts of biology, the composition of state legislatures and
the tradition of selective indifference to the effects of childbearing on the
status of women, a similar statement about abortion would sound distinctly
hollow. None of the other discussion in any of the opinions, however,
picks up this thread.1
28
B. The Problem of Pain
Justice O'Connor's concurrence contains a second evocative theme,
one which rings potentially controlling echoes in other opinions. She inti-
125. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (state cannot insist on its own vision of woman's role by
mandating child-bearing); id. at 856 ("ITlhe ability of women to participate equally in the eco-
nomic and social life of the Nation is facilitated by their [right to obtain abortions]"); id. at 896
(rejection of traditional subservient role of women in family implies rejection of husband notifi-
cation requirement); id. at 928 (Blackman, J., concurring) (arguing that prohibition of abortion
denies women equal status). See also Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753,
789-92, 802-04 (1993) (Stevens, L., and O'Connor, J., dissenting). Likewise, Justice Ginsburg
has previously suggested that the link between pregnancy and gender would have been a better
basis for Roe. See Ginsburg, supra note 21.
126. See Kreimer, supra note 12, at 849-53.
127. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. Issues of equality appear on the other side of the scales in the majority's discussion of
the State's "interest in protecting vulnerable groups ... from abuse, neglect and mistakes." Iad at
2273. The concern with an "insidious bias against the handicapped" and the protection of "dis-
abled and terminally ill people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes," and social
indifference, as well as an account of Washington's claim that "all persons's lives ... regardless
of physical or mental condition are under full protection of the law" suggest that a concern for
equality of burdens weighs against recognizing a right of assisted suicide. Id. at 2272-73 (citing
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 592-93).
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mates that she might acknowledge a "constitutionally cognizable interest in
obtaining relief from the suffering [patients] may experience in the last
days of their lives" in circumstances different from the ones before the
Court.'9 By "suffering," Justice O'Connor apparently means patients in
"great pain," of the sort that can be alleviated by the medication that is in
fact available in both New York and Washington.
1 30
Justice Breyer, who joins Justice O'Connor's opinion, emphasizes in
his separate opinion the "legal significance" of Justice O'Connor's
views.'31 Justice Breyer's separate concurrence suggests that he might find
a basis in "our legal tradition" for a "right to die with dignity" compounded
of elements of personal dignity, medical treatment and freedom from state-
inflicted pain.132 But for Justice Breyer, like Justice O'Connor, "the avoid-
ance of severe physical pain (connected with death) would have to com-
prise an essential part of any successful claim."
133
This focus on physical suffering raises immediate questions. Justices
O'Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer are aware that the process of dying carries
with it the prospect of suffering that extends beyond the physical. Justice
O'Connor begins her opinion by contemplating the prospect of "the despair
that [perhaps] accompanies'physical deterioration and loss of control of ba-
sic bodily and mental functions."'134 Physical suffering is not the most
common source of desire for assisted suicide, either in the Netherlands
where it is legal or, as best as one can determine, in the United States where
it is extra-legal.135 Indeed, the plaintiffs in Glucksberg complained of both
129. 117 S. Ct. at2303 (O'Connor, 3., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., concurring).
132. Id at2311.
133. Id. ("[the] avoidance of unnecessary and severe physical suffering"). "New York and
WVashington do not force a dying person to undergo that kind of pain." Id. State laws "do not in-
terfere by bringing the State's police powers to bear." Id. at 2312. "Were state law to pre-
vent... the administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life-the law's impact
upon serious and otherwise unavoidable physical pain (accompanying death) would be more di-
rectly at issue." Id.
'134. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, I., concurring).
135. For the United States, see, e.g., William Breitbar et al, Interest in Physician Assisted
Suicide Among Ambulatory HIVInfected Patients, 153 AM. J. PYSCH. 238, 241 (1996) (finding
no correlation between pain and desire for assisted suicide); Anthony L. Black et al, Physician
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State 275 JAMA 919 (1996) (stating that 75% of
patients requesting assisted suicide or euthanasia were concerned about being a burden to their
families; 35% were concerned about experiencing severe pain); Robert Blendon et al., Should
Physicians Aid their Patients in Dying?: The Public Perspective, 267 JAMA 2568, 2660 (1992)
(stating that among those who would consider ending their lives in case of a terminal illness, 47%
cited "fears of burdening their families," 20% cited fear of pain).
For the Netherlands, see, e.g., Johanna H. Groenewoud, Physician-Assisted Death in Psychi-
atric Practice in the Netherlands, 336 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1795 (1997) (stating that among
psychiatric patients requesting assisted suicide or euthanasia, 68% cited the absence of any hope
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pain and indignity. As Justice Souter emphasizes, "The patients here
sought not only an end to pain (which they might have had, although per-
haps at the price of stupor) but an end to their short remaining lives with a
dignity that they believed would be denied them by powerful pain medica-
tion, as well as by their consciousness of dependency and helplessness as
they approached death."'
3 6
Why, then, do Justices Breyer and O'Connor focus on physical pain as
the touchstone of a possible constitutional right? What might be the prove-
nance and dimensions of this focus on physical pain?
1. Legal Sources
A discernable line of cases extends some constitutional cognizance to
the bodily integrity of the individual. The line begins in the 19th century; it
flourishes most recently in Cruzan and Casey.137 But this right does not
necessarily relate to pain; it is grounded in "rights to bodily integrity and
freedom from unwanted touching," and asserts the citizen's sovereign con-
trol over all aspects of her person.,38 The earliest of this line of cases, Un-
ion Pacific RR Co. v. Botsford, involved a medical examination to be con-
ducted "in [a] manner not to expose the person of the plaintiff in any
indelicate manner."139 These cases contemplate a right to assert sover-
of improvement, 29% cited a desire not to be a burden to others, 18% cited pain or physical suf-
fering); Paul J. Van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the
End ofLife, 338 LANcEr 669, 672 (1991) (stating that pain was the reason for request for assisted
suicide or euthanasia in less than half of cases); G. van der Wal et al., Euthanasia andAssisted
Suicide 1I. Do Dutch Family Doctors Act Prudently?, 9 FAM. PRAC. 135, 138 (1992) (same).
136. 117 S. Ct. at 2289 (Souter, J., concurring). Plaintiffs "would have chosen such a suicide
for the sake of personal dignity, apart even from relief from pain.' Id. at 2276. Justice Stevens
also alludes to the issue in passing: "avoiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living one's
final days incapacitated and in agony." Id. at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring); "[t]he interests of a
person who because of pain, incapacity or sedation finds her life intolerable." Id. at 2308.
137. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 ("It is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments
in Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a per-
son's ... bodily integrity." (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952))). See also Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 269 (citing Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); 497 U.S. at
287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Because our notions of liberty are inextricably intertwined with
our idea of physical freedom and self determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions
into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause,' (citing Rochin, 342
U.S. 165; Botsford, 141 U.S. 250; Winston, 470 U.S. 753; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
.(1966))).
138. See Vacco, 117 S. CL at2301.
139. 141 U.S. 250.
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eignty over one's own body by avoiding any unwanted touching; the physi-
cal impingement need not necessarily involve the infliction of pain.14°
The issue in these cases is, for the most part, one of the degree of in-
trusion into self-sovereignty; pain is at most an element in the calculus of
constitutionality. 141 Moreover, these cases involve common law batteries-
actions by others that impinge on the bodily integrity of the individual from
the outside. Governmental prohibitions of actions which affect an individ-
ual own body have not regularly invoked any. similar level of constitutional
scrutiny. 42 And the right provided by these cases is not a strong one, it can
be overbalanced by legitimate, not necessarily compelling, state interests.'43
There is, however, another line of cases where pain plays a more cen-
tral, powerful, and determinative role.. The Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment directly addresses the perception that the
Constitution should prevent the state from being party to the infliction of
brutal pain on its citizens. Whatever else it prohibits, there is a fair consen-
sus that the Eighth Amendment will not allow state officials knowingly to
impose brutal pain even on those convicted of heinous crimes. Even for
those sentenced to death, the Court has held for more than a century that "it
is safe to affirm that punishments of torture... and all others in the same
line of unnecessary cruelty.., are forbidden:"' 4 "Unnecessary and wan-
140. In Cruzan, the plaintiff was in a persistent vegetative state and there is no indication the
feeding tube was painful. See 497 U.S. at 266. In Winston, the operation was to be carried out
under anaesthesia. See 470 U.S. at 764.
141. Cf. Schmerber, 384 U.S at 771 ("[Blood test] involves virtually no risk, trauma or
pain"); Winston, 470 U.S. at 761 (pain is an element of the "extent to which the procedure may
threaten the safety or health of the individual"); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (intrusion might not be
allowed if it "would seriously impair... health, or... cause... death").
142. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (use of unproven and unlicensed
medication); Minnesota ex reL Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921) (use of narcotics);
cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (same).
Casey, of course, expands the concept of bodily integrity to include control of abortion, and
several justices in Glucksberg further expand the concept. Susan Wolf argues, with some persua-
siveness, that Casey bears a family resemblance to prior cases because it involves the exclusion of
an unwanted external element (the fetus) from the woman's body and seeks a return to the status
quo before the unwanted external element. Susan Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Abortion,
and Treatment Refusal: Using Gender to Analyze the Difference, in PHYSICLAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE: ETHICAL PoSrIoNs, MEDIcAL PRACTICE, AND PUBLIC PoLicY OPTIONS 167 (Robert
Weir ed. 1997). She suggests that the exclusion of this unwanted external element is of particular
importance to women.
Whether or not this analogy is ultimately persuasive, the abortion cases, which I treat below,
are the only bodily integrity cases that speak to the issue of government prohibition of self-
sovereignty outside of the realm of physical battery.
143. In Botsford, for example, the result seems to turn on the absence of precedent "in a per-
sonal action," as opposed to examinations in criminal cases or divorces, where such examination
would be permitted. 141 U.S. at252.
144. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879).
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ton infliction of physical pain" has been universally conceded to be outside
of the scope of legitimate punishment.145  So, too, even before the Court
applied the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination to the
states, torture to obtain criminal convictions was outside of the moral uni-
verse delineated by the Constitution. The concept of ordered liberty im-
plied that "[t]he rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the
witness stand.' 46
Physical confinement by the government, or even bondage, may be ac-
ceptable under appropriate circumstances; 147 raw imposition of pain is not.
As applied to capital cases, the boundaries of the prohibition on torture have allowed sub-
stantial pain to accompany execution. Compare Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1237-39 (1983)
(Burger, CJ., concurring in denial of certiorari) with id. at 1240-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (describing gruesome and painful death by cyanide gas which can extend over
several minutes); Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct., 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting from vacation of stay) (describing painful death from cyanide gas which extended over ten
minutes); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial ofcertio-
rari) (describing electrocution as a painful experience lasting several minutes).
The Court has, nonetheless suggested that lingering and excruciating pain is out of bounds
even for executions. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (commenting that "punish-
ments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death") (upholding electrocution); Louisi-
ana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (observing that "the traditional hu-
manity of modem Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution
of the death sentence [as part of the] prohibition against the wanton infliction of pain.").
145. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (denial of medical care for "serious
medical needs" violates the Eighth Amendment) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976)); 429 U.S. at 103 ("[UJ]necessary suffering is inconsistant with contemporary standards
of decency."); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31, (1993) (reaffinming Estelle: Eighth
Amendment prohibits unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain); id at 33 (conditions of con-
finement that are sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering violate the
Constitution); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (reaffirming "general requirement" that
the Eighth Amendment proscribes "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or torture, even if
no serious physical injury eventuates); id at 26 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Diabolic or inhuman
punishments by definition inflict serious injury. That is not to say the injury must be, or always
will be, physical. 'Many things... may cause agony as they occur yet leave no enduring injury.
The state is not fred to inflict such pains withoutjust cause."') (quoting Williams v. Boles, 841
F.2d 181, (7th Cir. 1988))); cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) ("cruelty by
laws... inflicting bodily pain or mutilation" was core evil at which Eighth Amendment was di-
rected); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1891) (Field, 3., dissenting) ("[The] designa-
tion... is usually applied to punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew,
the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with acute pain and suffer-
ing.")
To violate the Eighth Amendment, the imposition in question must be the result of either in-
tent or deliberate indifference, see, e.g. Farmer v. Brennan,511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), but knowl-
edge of the situation of the patients affected by the ban on assisted suicide can hardly be dis-
avowed. Iad at 843 n.8; cf Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 n.13 (citing Resweber, 329 U.S. 459)
(unconstitutional cruelty can result from "a series of abortive attempts, or a single cruelly willful
attempt")).
146. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,284-85 (1936).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (denial of bail for dangerous
individuals); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2077 (1997) (incarceration of "sexually via-
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If there are certain physical sensations that the state cannot legitimately in-
flict on prisoners in retaliation even for the most heinous of crimes, pre-
sumably the state similarly may not inflict them on innocent individuals. 4
There may be some novelty in suggesting that the state is constitution-
ally barred not only from directly imposing severe pain, but also from pre-
venting the alleviation of physical suffering caused by other forces. But
.telle, two decades ago, concluded that deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners can impose constitutionally impermissible
"wanton and unnecessary pain. 149 Indeed, one of the examples cited by
the Court in Estelle as "cruel and unusual punishment! was refusal to ad-
minister a prescribed pain killer to prisoners after surgery.1
50
2. Pain or Suffering?
The focus on physical pain accords with a particular conception of the
role of courts in enforcing unenumerated rights. Under this view, the con-
straints of the unwritten constitution are invoked most legitimately, not in
support of an effort to assure the -best that government can achieve, but in
an effort to avoid the worst. Thus, most members of the Court have been
reluctant to mandate an affirmative provision of benefits, but have been
less constrained in preventing physical abuse by government officials. In
the days before the incorporation of the Bill of Rights' protections regard-
ing criminal procedure against the states, physical brutality was often the
Court's touchstone in determining whether the efforts of law enforcement
lent predator"); cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1982) (physical restraint of
mental patient); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213-14 (1990) (forced medication of pris-
oner).
148. Cf. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321 (persons involuntarily committed are entitled to more
considerate treatment than criminals); Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244
(1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,535-36 nn.16-17 (1979).
Indeed in his concurrence in Resweber, 329 U.S. at 469, Justice Frankfurter viewed the pro-
hibition of willful infliction of great physical cruelty in a manner that violates standards of de-
cency to be a part of the due process protection of "principles ofjustice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental:"
In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 n.39 (1977), the Court rejected an argument that
the Eighth Amendment extended of its own force to constrain disciplinary paddling of students in
school, and suggested that no real threat of abuse was present because state common law and stat-
ute guarded against "excessive physical punishment." The Court specifically refused to address
the contention that substantive due process barred punishments as to students that would be un-
constitutional as to convicted criminals. See id. at 659 n.12.
149. 429 U.S. 97; cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (denial of surgery necessary to re-
pair prisoner's Achilles tendon can constitute Eighth Amendment violation).
150. 429 U.S. at 104 n.10.
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were at odds with deeply rooted tradition; 51 actions that shock the con-
science have often involved active imposition of physical harm.
152
The issue of assisted suicide provokes violent debates over what out-
come should be regarded as "the worsft that government can wreak. From
Patrick Henry's claim to regard death as preferable to the loss of liberty to
the periodic espousal of the ideal of death before dishonor, parts of our
cultural heritage support a perception that the senses of dependency and
loss of control that accompany terminal illness can be worse than death it-
self. This belief, however, is far from universal. Other elements of our
heritage dispute the perception that dependence and physical or mental in-
capacity reduce dignity. What some experience as degrading dependency,
others regard as a physical condition that simply highlights the interde-
pendence in which all human beings function. Indeed, with the rise of the
disability rights movement, the claims that physical limitation is anathema
to human dignity assume a potentially invidious character. And, of course,
a strand of our heritage denies that a chosen death is ever an appropriate
response to suffering.
15 3
For the Court to embody a moral perception in a constitutional man-
date, the Justices properly seek commitments that can claim a broad if not
universal consent. In an increasingly diverse culture, the definition of dig-
nity or mental suffering is not likely to provide that touchston6.15 4 The fo-
cus on physical agony seeks to find that archimedean point in the experi-
ence of physical pain.
To the extent that public opinion is relevant, it seems that the public
support in the United States currently for assisted suicide is focused in
large measure on cases where suicide is the only alternative to physical suf-
fering.155 This breadth of support is hardly surprising. Pain is a basic
151. See e.g. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944);
Brown, 297 U.S. 278.
152. See, e.g, Roehinv. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
153. Thus, the very controverted nature of dignity, which some proponents of assisted suicide
see as a basis for excluding the state from prohibiting particular modes of writing life's last chap-
ter, see, e.g., RONALD DwORKN, LIF's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 216-17 (1993), is itself a reason to be dubious of using
dignity as the basis for overturning laws which plausibly rest on claims to protect others from
physical danger and suffering.
154. A comparable issue was raised this Term in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v.
Buckley, 117 S. Ct. 2117 (1997), where the subjectivity of emotional suffering led the Court to
reject a claim seeking tort recovery under the FELA for emotional distress in the absence of de-
monstrable physical symptoms.
155. See, e.g., Ezekiel Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Attitudes
and Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists and the Public, 347 LANCET 1805 (1996)
(among oncology patients and the public, 70.5% and 66.5% respectively support assisted suicide
physiological experience, common across cultures." 6 Few in our culture
regard avoidable physical agony as good or even acceptable. It is an evil of
great magnitude that extends beyond the physical; extreme pain totally oc-
cupies the psychic world. 57 Thus, in a parallel discussion in recent politi-
cal philosophy, Professor Barry has suggested that avoiding physical harm
is a good candidate for a consensus value because such harm is "deleterious
from the point of view of a very wide range of conceptions of the
good.... [O]n virtually any conception of the good, life goes better in the
absence of physical injury."158 It does not devalue the physical dependency
experienced by large segments of our population to avow that physical ag-
ony may be unbearable.
Pain holds another attraction as a guidepost. To the extent that physi-
cal agony is an empirically definable sensation, it provides a hand-hold on
the slippery slopes that surround assisted suicide. There is likely to be
greater agreement on whether an individual is in agony than on whether he
in the case of unremitting pain, 38.3% and 36.2% on the basis that the patient is a burden on the
family).
156. See, e.g., Roger C. Serlin et al., When is Cancer Pain Mild Moderate or Severe? Grad-
ingPain Severity bylts Interference with Function, 61 PAIN 277 (1995) (validity of pain scales is
reproducible across cultures within the United States and around the world); Knox H. Todd et al.,
The Effect of Ethnicity On Physician Estimates of Pain Severity in Patients with Isolated Ex-
tremity Trauma, 271 JAMA 925 (1994) (Hispanic and Anglo patients report identical assessments
of pain for similar injuries); ERIC J. CASSE1L, T NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OF
MEDICINE 103 (1991) ("Dedicated receptors-nociceptors-exist for painful stimuli whose neu-
ral impulses are conducted over specialized pathways in the peripheral nerves, spinal cord and
brain... certain kinds of stimuli elicit the sensory response ofnociception in every culture, now
and forever.").
157. See, e.g, ELAINE SCAERY, TH1MBODYINPAIN33 (1985) ("[]n serious pain the claims of
the body utterly nullify the claims of the world"); id. at 54 (pain "obliterat[es] ... the contents of
consciousness").
158. BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY 87-88 (1995). See also SISSELA BOK,
COMMON VALUES 15-16, 18-19, 30, 57 (1995) (citing duties to refrain from coercion and vio-
lence as "moral minimalism" common across cultures); STUART HAMPsiRE, INNOCENCE AND
EXPERIENCE 90 (1989) (identifying "the great evils of human experience, reaffirmed in every
age... : murder and the destruction of life, imprisonment, enslavement ... physical pain and
torture"); cf. MICHAEL WA.LZER, THICK AND THIN 10 (1994) (arguing for universal applicability
of "negative injunctions ... against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and tyranny" that "re-
spond to other people's pain and oppression"); SCARRY, supra note 157, at 52 (observing that
"the most essential aspect of pain is its sheer aversiveness. While other sensations have content
that may be positive, neutral or negative, the content of pain is itself negation.").
Professor Barry argues firther from the fact that "every society falls back on a quite limited
range of punishments" including "physical confinement, loss of bodily parts, pain, and death.
Unless these were regarded by people with a wide variety of conceptions of the good as evils, they
would not function reliably as punishments." BARRY, supra, at 141. This suggests, as well that
an examination of the definition of unacceptable cruelty for purposes of punishment is a good
place to start the investigation of social values that are sufficiently deeply rooted to be enforced by
the Court.
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or she is "terminal' 159 or "competent' 160 or subject to "undue influ-
ence," 16 1 -the other bright line distinctions that have been suggested. 6 2 To
the extent that approved medical interventions are keyed to the elimination
of physical agony rather than ending life, they provide an opportunity in
most situations to test the hypothesis that the elimination of physical suf-
fering will in fact eliminate the desire for death. Efforts to lessen pain al-
low opportunities for second thoughts, and if the law permits only medical
interventions that have the primary intent of alleviating physical suffering,
the scope of the population at risk is limited to those who actually experi-
ence physical agony, and whose physical condition is sufficiently compro-
mised that adequate palliative and analgesic intervention puts their health at
risk.
63
The focus of alleviation of physical pain carries the risk of hypocrisy,
if physicians simply replace acquiescence in a desire for suicide with ac-
quiescence in a patient's stated desire to be "double effected to death."'6'
159. On the difficulties of defining the "terminally ill," see Joanne Lynn et al., Defining the
"Terminally Ill:" Insights from SUPPORT, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 311 (1996).
160. Primary care physicians fail to detect 45-90% of psychiatric disorders. L. Eisenberg,
Treating Depression and Anxiety in Primary Care--Closing the Gap between Knowledge and
Practice, 326 NEW ENG. 3. MED. 1080, 1081 (1992). Even among psychiatrists, an Oregon study
suggests that only 6% were very confident they can determine in a single consultation whether a
desire for suicide is the result of mental disorders. See Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon
Psychiatrists Toward Physician Assisted Suicide, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1631 (1994).
161. As a way of preserving patient autonomy, the Oregon assisted suicide statute makes it a
crime to exercise "undue influence" in inducing an individual to choose assisted suicide. Oregon
Ballot Measure 16, 1994, Section 4.02 (2). The vagueness of the standard seems self-evident.
Of course, since pain is a subjective sensation, a person determined to commit suicide could
continue to report pain after it has in fact ceased.
162. See, e.g., Eric Chevlin, The Limits of Prognostication, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 337 (1996).
163. A right to assisted suicide rooted in rational self-determination runs the risk of a danger-
ously synergistic interaction with the tendency of physicians to underestimate the quality of life of
those who are physically compromised. If doctors tend to view physically compromised existence
as a low quality life more often than patient do, see e.g., Richard F. Uhiman & Robert A.
Pearlman, Perceived Quality of Life and Preferences for Life-Sustaining Treatment in Older
Adults, 151 ARCIVES INTERNAL MED. 495 (1991); Robert A. Pearlman & Richard F. Uhlmann,
Quality of Life in Chronic Disease: Perceptions of Elderly Patients 43 J. GERONTOLOGY M25,
M27 (1988), there is a risk that doctors will regularly underestimate the degree to which suicide
requests are the result of treatable depression.
By contrast, the fact that physicians tend to underestimate the level of their patients' pain,
see Todd et al., supra note 156, at 147; Quality Improvement Guidelines for the Treatment of
Acute Pain and Cancer Pain, 274 JAMA 1874 (1995); Grossman et al., Correlation of Patient
and Caregiver Ratings of Cancer Pain, 6 J. PAIN SYMPTOMMGT. 53 (1991), provides another bit
of friction on the slippery slope.
164. Standard medical ethics permit pain relief even when the medication may hasten death on
the theory of the "principle of double effect" by which a foreseen but undesired effect may be ac-
ceptable if the intended effect of an action is itself normally permissible. See, e.g., Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Decisions Near the End ofLife, 267 JAMA 2229,
2231,2233 (1992).
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But here, as elsewhere, hypocrisy is the homage of vice to virtue. A medi-
cal regime which allows palliative risk continues to focus attention on
avoiding pain, rather than imposing death, and at the margins, it will be less
likely to be deformed by coerced or manipulated desires for death. For
doctors who seek moral support in their efforts to undertake the difficult
process of caring for dying patients and resist the temptations of dramati-
cally ending the struggle, such a regime provides better moral landmarks
than the alternatives.
3. Pain, The Right to Choose and the "Right to Die"
There are thus solid bases to invoke the interest in being free from
pain as a common value adequate to ground a right to constitutional inter-
vention. At first glance, however, this focus leaves Justices O'Connor,
Ginsburg and Breyer in the same quandary as the majority when it comes to
distinguishing the conceded right to abortion from the rejected right to as-
sisted suicide. Pregnancy and childbirth often do involve physical suffer-
ing.165 But laws forbidding abortion permit maternal anesthetics just as
New York and Washington permit terminal sedation.
It is not in the role of pain per se, but in the balance the abortion cases
strike between the interests of women's health and the interests of the state
in preserving fetal life that a connection can be forged. In the abortion
cases, the state may not overcome the general right to bodily autonomy by
asserting an interest in preserving fetal life during the first two trimesters,
when the status of a fetus as a human being is a matter of unresolved de-
bate. In the third trimester, however, the state may intervene coercively to
preserve a life that it is entitled to regard as a fully rights-bearing human
being. So, too, in the case of assisted suicide, the individuals at issue are
by all moral accounts human beings, and the state can invoke its interest in
preserving human life at a compelling level. Indeed, in support of the sys-
tem of prohibiting assisted suicide-which is what was challenged in
Glucksberg-the state invokes a concern that human life will be ended by
mistake or through coercion. If the abortion cases set a legitimate balance
between bodily autonomy and preservation of life, then the state's interest
in avoiding mistaken or coerced death is an adequate basis for imposing
upon the right to bodily autonomy by prohibiting assisted suicide.
One physician of my acquaintance commented to me on the number of patients whom he has
seen "double effected to death" with pain-killing drugs.
165. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("The
mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that
only she must bear. ... Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman's role... 2').
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I But there is another level to the analysis. In the abortion cases, a dan-
ger to the health of the pregnant woman tips the balance again in favor of
individual autonomy even in the third trimester. The state may not require
a pregnant woman to sacrifice her health even for a viable fetus. Unremit-
ting physical agony, like the danger to a woman's health in the case of the
third trimester abortion, seems to provide a counterweight of a magnitude
equal to the state's claim of danger to life. A general prohibition of suicide
sacrifices what some citizens regard as their dignity in order to preserve the
lives of others. This choice seems at worst debatable; it can hardly be
characterized as arbitrary.166 By contrast a government which condemns
some citizens to avoidable physical agony in order to preserve others
against the risk of death is on shakier ground. The sacrifice the state de-
mands in pursuit of its ends is not so clearly justified, if it is justified at all.
4. Rights, Pain, and the Future
If the O'Connor/Breyer position grants constitutional stature to a right
to avoid government-imposed pain, where might the perception lead? The
opinions clearly contemplate potential judicial review were legislation or
regulations to prohibit physicians from administering doses of pain medi-
cation necessary to avoid terminal suffering. But it is far from clear that
such legislation or regulations in fact exist. 67 So, too, some commentators
maintain that a small percentage of patients suffer physical agony that can-
not be controlled by medication. If this is true-and it is not clear whether
these estimates of 5-10% of some classes of terminal patients account for
the possibility of "terminal sedation" by which a patient is kept perma-
nently unconscious as a way of avoiding pain16--a suit by such a patient
166. Cf. Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997) (striking down required drug test of
c6ndidates for state office as reducing "privacy for a symbol's sake").
167. See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 164; George Annas, The
"Right to Die" in America: Sloganeeringfrom Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34
DUQ. L. REV. 875, 895 (1996) (prescribing pain medication is not illegal; no doctor has ever been
prosecuted); I ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 590 (2d ed. 1995) (no basis for fear of criminal
liability); id. at 592 (no basis for fear of license revocation for provision of narcotics to patients
suffering serious pain).
168. Justice Breyer comments that "[m]edical technology, we are repeatedly told makes the
administration of pain reliving drugs sufficient, except for a very few individuals for whom the
ineffectiveness of pain control medicines can mean, not pain but the need for sedation which can
end in a coma." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2312-13. Justice Stevens, by contrast cites authorities
which he thinks stand for the proposition that "palliative care... cannot alleviate all pain and
suffering." Id at 2308.
Compare David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very Mod-
est Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443, 454 (1997) ("not all physical pain can be treated"), cited by
Justice Stevenes, with Michael It Levy, Drug Therapy: Pharmacologic Treatment of 'ancer
Pain, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1124, 1124 (1996) (commenting that "[n]o patient with cancer
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who sought the means to escape pain by ending her life could also invoke
the concurrences' concerns. Again, however, it appears that the number of
such cases is likely to be small.
Justice Breyer writes carefully in suggesting a right against "severe
physical pain (connected with death)" or "(accompanying death).' 69 But
to the extent that I have adequately reconstructed the rationale for the focus
on physical pain, it is hard to discern why the claim to avoid agonizing
physical pain should be limited to those who are dying. Prisoners retain the
right to avoid unnecessary infliction of pain during their lives; presumably
civilians can invoke similar interests. At the very least, prohibitive laws
which eliminate the possibility of avoiding pain or physical harm should be
subject to severe constitutional scrutiny. Thus, in the looming disputes
over needle exchanges, 170 and access to morphine as an analgesic in non-
terminal cases, . the courts need not stand aside in the face of merely ra-
tional state interests.
More controversially, the focus on physical pain could ground a right
of access to certain types of medical treatment. To the extent that govern-
ment intervention establishes institutional structures that bar access to
medical treatment that can eliminate physical agony, the O'Connor/Breyer
concurrences provide a hook for constitutional review. The claim would
not embrace every intervention that could improve health outcomes. The
right in question is rooted in a revulsion against torture, which comprises
needs to live or die with unrelieved pain" because "cancer pain can be effectively treated in 85-
95% ofpatients.... In the final days of life, pain not controlled... can be relieved by intentional
sedation"). Cf Nathan I. Cherney & Russell K. Portenoy, Sedation in the Management of Re-
fractory Symptoms: Guidelines for Evaluation and Treatment, 10 J. PALIATIE CARE 31 (1994);
Terminal Sedation in the Care of Dying Patients, ARCH INr. MED., 1785 (Sept. 9, 1996) (esti-
mates of frequency of symptoms that cannot be relieved short of terminal sedation range from 5%
to 52%).
169. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2311-12.
170. It is clear that needle exchange programs are effective in preventing the spread of AIDS
among injection drug users. See Peter Lurie and Ernest Drucker, An Opportunity Lost: HIVIn-
fections Associated With Lack of a National Needle-Exchange Programme in the USA, 349
LANCEr 604, 605 (1997) (estimating between 4000 and 9600 cases of AIDs could have been pre-
vented by needle exchange programs, and more than 11,000 could be prevented in the next five
years; noting that staff members in needle exchange programs have been arrested); Don C. Des
Jarlais et al., M-11V Incidence Among Injecting Drug Users in New Your City Syringe-Exchange
Programmes, 348 LANCET 987 (1995) (reviewing the efficacy of needle-exchange programs in
preventing the spread of AIDS). But federal and local prohibitions on the distribution of sterile
drug injection materials make these programs illegal in some areas, and infeasible in others. See
Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Prevention of IVAIDS and other Blood Borne Diseases Among In-
jection Drug Users: A National Survey on the Regulation of Syringes and Needles, 277 JAMA
53 (1997); cf. Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1993); State v. Sorge, 591 A.2d
1382 (NJ. Super. 1991); People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1991). See also Katharine Q.
Seelye, AMA Calls for Needle Exchanges, N.Y. TIMEs, June 27, 1997, at A15.
171. See, e.g., Hill, When Will Adequate Pain Treatment Be the Norm?, 274 JAMA 1881
(1995); Diane Gianelli, Controlling Chronic Pain, 40 AM. MED. NEWs 1, Mar. 17, 1997.
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the government imposing current physical agony on real individuals. But a
government-mandated HMO that systematically denies medically indicated
emergency room care, like a health official who denies the latest generation
of protease inhibitors to homeless individuals, or a system that rations other
life-saving care parsimoniously would seem prima facie to violate the same
principle that inhibits the government from "preventing... the administra-
tion of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life."
172
The claim is not without potential doctrinal obstacles. Justice Breyer
exonerates the government from responsibility for the "institutional reasons
or inadequacies or obstacles" which currently inhibit the delivery of pallia-
tive treatment; he would entertain a claim only "were state law to prevent
the provision of palliative care," which "forces a dying person to undergo
[severe] pain."173 The determinative issue will be what quantum of state
involvement is adequate to trigger constitutional concern. In Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, only "deliberate indifference" to serious medi-
cal needs is proscribed; in the parallel issue of safety in custodial facilities,
a choice informed by medical judgment is enough to meet the standards of
due process,174 and there is always the possibility that the state may dis-
claim responsibility for the actions of the agents to whom it has left crucial
choices.175 But as the government moves to an increasingly extensive in-
volvement in and regulation of medical care, the Glucksberg concurrences
provide hope of a constitutional minimum of decency in the administration
of that system.
VL Conclusion: The Supreme Court as Teacher
In an increasingly diverse society, the risk grows that we will lose our
power to actually engage one another on moral issues. The Supreme Court
172. Cf. David Bansberg, MPH, M.D., et al., Protease Inhibitors in the Homeless, 278 JAMA
63 (1997). A court seeking to avoid entanglement in the area could still claim that the constitu-
tional inhibition extends only to "mnecessary" imposition of physical pain. See Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring). But in the prison context, the Eighth Amendment prohibits
"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.' See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 106
(1976).
173. 117 S.Ct. at2312.
174. See Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307,319 (1982).
175. Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Sere., 489 U.S. 189 (1989);
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (deci-
si6ns by nursing homes receiving Medicaid funds were not state action); with, e.g., Catanzano v.
Dowling, 60 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1995) (decisions by certified home health agencies denying serv-
ices are state action requiring due process); Grijalva v.Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747 (D. Ariz. 1996)
(Medicare HMO decision denying services is state action requiring due process). A great deal is
likely to turn on the degree to which the government is directly and intentionally responsible for
the structure in question, and the degree to which it has preempted other structures of care.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTINAL LAW OUAA TERLY [Vol. 24:863
can sometimes counteract these dangers by providing a locus of common
moral deliberation. When it takes this role, it can, on occasion, furnish a
common vocabulary to discuss and resolve contentious issues. But, as
many commentators have noted, in the process of resolving eases authori-
tatively, the Court risks excluding legitimate moral viewpoints from subse-
quent public discussion. This has been one critique of the Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade. 76
In this dimension, the Glucksberg decision avoids this arguable failing
of Roe- each of the opinions takes seriously the claims of tragic deprivation
advanced by the opposing camps before the Court. The opinions that ex-
plicitly leave open the possibility of future judicial intervention fully ac-
knowledge the good faith of the proponents of prohibition. And Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion, unlike some of the prior cases in which the
court has deferred to the political process by dismissing claims of constitu-
tional protection as "facetious,' 177 accepts and embraces a role for the
Court in guarding the bodily integrity of the citizenry. The majority sounds
sincere when it acknowledges an "earnest and profound debate about the
morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide.' 78
Each of the opinions emphasizes the ongoing discussion in which so-
ciety is engaged. 179 When all of the opinions are taken together, the Court
frames and advances that debate rather than ending it. By highlighting
rather than belittling the tragic dimensions of assisted suicide, the Court has
thus laid the groundwork for continued moral conversation.
176. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTTUDES AND THE LAw 98-110
(1985); ROBERTA. BURT, THE CONSTITUTIONIN CONFLICT 344-351, 357-62 (1992); MARYANN
GLENDON, ABORTIONAND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 45-50 (1987).
177. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 186, 194 (1986).
178. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2275.
179. See id. (Rehnquist, CJ.) ("Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound de-
bate.... "); id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Every one of us at some point may be af-
fected... It]here is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the proper bal-
ance.... "); id. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring) (Court should "stay its hand to allow reasonable
legislative consideration").
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